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The anthropological dimension of international
crimes and international criminal justice
ilias bantekas
Introduction
The enforcement of norms involves a series of objective actions, in the
sense that what is at stake is not the perspective of the judge, the
prosecutor, the accused or the victim as to the appropriateness and
legitimacy of the relevant law. On the contrary, subjectivity should play
no role in the administration of criminal law and the entire criminal
justice system operates in such a way as to avoid the infusion of
personal biases. This, of course, is welcome because the law is already
publicly available and hence any personal views of the judge or the
prosecutor would violate the principle against retroactivity. Hence, this
chapter attempts to explain why a departure is necessary in order to
understand the particular context of societies in conﬂict and the social
interactions inherent therein. For a very long time, international crimes
have been assessed solely on the basis of the norms regulating armed
conﬂict and criminal conduct, absent a thorough examination of the
social and cultural context within which the relevant actors existed.
However, what is different between the perspective of culture and
society provided by anthropology as opposed to other social sciences
is its particular vantage point; that is, its view of society and culture
from the point of view of the direct participants under observation. The
anthropologist is interested in the way that his subjects view family,
lineage, religion, work, socialisation and everything else that makes
them who they are and behave in the way they do. It is therefore no
accident that the term cultural relativism, which is so prevalent in
human rights discourse, originated in anthropology but possessed from
the outset a very different meaning.1 Boas, who ﬁrst conceived but did
1 In human rights it is taken to mean that culture ultimately validates the legitimacy and
application of particular rights, thereby rejecting the notion that human rights apply to all
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not coin the term, was dissatisﬁed with evolutionist theories of his time,
which viewed some civilisations as higher or superior to others. To him
cultural relativism was a method of examining cultural variation free from
prejudice. Given that prejudice is inherent in all observation of the external
world, Boas sought to see the world from the eyes of the informants, or
natives (the term is not used pejoratively).2 It is only when one possesses a
good enough understanding of the lives of others that one is legitimised to
offer moral judgement against them and, in the case at hand, to apply
criminal sanctions in a just and equitable manner.
As the chapter goes on to demonstrate, our understanding of a particular
culture prior to the outbreak of hostilities or mass human rights violations
serves numerous purposes which for the most part have been outside the
radar of contemporary international criminal tribunals and their respective
mandates. At a functional level, anthropology may tell us what the affected
societies aspire to and what they think about international criminal justice,3
which in turn should shape – not necessarily dictate – the international
community’s relevant transitional justice policies.4 This aside, culture paints
a fairly accurate picture as regards hierarchies, membership and afﬁliation in
clans and kinship mechanisms, which in turn helps determine complex
liabilities, such as command responsibility and joint criminal enterprise
without distinction; i.e., that human rights are universal. This conception of culture risks
justifying violations of human rights, as is the case with the practice of female genital
mutilation. See J. Donnelly, ‘Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights’, (1984) 6
Human Rights Quarterly 400.
2 F. Boas, ‘Museums of Ethnology and their Classiﬁcation’, (1887) 9 Science 589.
3 See P. Pham and P. Vinck, ‘Research Note on Attitudes about Peace and Justice in
Northern Uganda’, Human Rights Centre at UC Berkeley Report (August 2007) at 2. Of
those surveyed in Northern Uganda 29 per cent were in favour of the ICC, 28 per cent
preferred Ugandan courts, 20 per cent were in favour of the amnesty commission, while
only 3 per cent supported the sole use of traditional justice mechanisms. However, when
asked if they favoured peace with amnesty or peace with trials, 80 per cent of the
respondents supported peace with amnesty.
4 Anthropology has been employed extensively by the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (IBRD) in relation to projects that affect the livelihoods of indigen-
ous peoples. In most recorded cases, however, the IBRD ignores the true wishes of the
affected group and is disinclined towards any form of consensual social engineering. In the
case of the indigenous Baka/Bakola of Cameroon, for example, the group wished to escape
their subservient status to another tribe and acquire land and educate their children. The
consultants advised the IBRD to retain the group’s traditional nomadic status and simply
to provide them with monetary forms of compensation for the impact caused by the
project to their traditional livelihood. See T. Grifﬁths, ‘Indigenous Peoples and the World
Bank: Experiences with Participation’ (Forest Peoples Program, 2005), available at www.
forestpeoples.org/sites/fpp/ﬁles/publication/2011/08/wbipsandparticipjul05eng.pdf.
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(JCE), among others. Moreover, anthropological observation helps us
decipher the contextual meaning of concepts that verge between the social
and the natural sciences, such as race, ethnicity and gender, bymeans of their
social construction. This chapter paves the way for the realisation of the
crucial function of anthropology in the investigation of mass crimes and the
need for specialist research alongside legal developments.
Why anthropology is relevant to the investigation
of international crimes
Anthropology and law seem at ﬁrst glance to have nothing in common.
The ﬁrst seeks to elucidate collective human behaviour and assess the
particular meanings understood by the participants (or informants in
anthropological parlance), whereas the second is concerned with rules
and order. It is evident that, since rules and order are not produced in a
void but rather with a view to regulating human relations, it follows that
law is a necessary component of culture in the same manner as work,
leisure, art, religion and others.5 Law need not necessarily be formal, as is
otherwise the case with legislation that is promulgated under strict
constitutional procedures, but it may just as well be informal without
the sanction of government. This informal law does not only exist in past
and present rural societies in the heartlands of Africa and Asia, but also
in the very midst of industrialised Western societies. The so-called lex
mercatoria and the pursuit of self-regulation by particular industries, as is
indeed the very concept of contract and party autonomy thereto, is
evidence of man’s desire to regulate in certain cases human interaction
by means of informal, but no less binding, prescriptions.6 Besides regu-
lating human relations, both formal and informal law, particularly the
latter, provide evidence of social relations, status and social interaction
within a given community. By way of illustration, the village chief is
typically the judge and the recognised authority in the interpretation of
customary law and, as such, is regarded as a revered ﬁgure. Equally, the
male warriors of the tribe, whose authority to hunt is recognised as a
5 For a general overview, see J. M. Conley and W. M. O’Barr, ‘Legal Anthropology comes
Home: A Brief History of the Ethnographic Study of Law’, (1993) 27 Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review 41.
6 According to Teubner, the ultimate validation of lex mercatoria rests on the fact that not
all legal orders are created by the nation state and, accordingly, that private orders of
regulation can create law. G. Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World
Society’, in G. Teubner (ed.), Global Law without a State (Dartmouth, 1997) at 15.
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customary entitlement, may enjoy ﬁrst rights to the tribe’s game. Social
status and the existence of complex roles and rules are also evident in the
internal sphere of criminal gangs operating in industrialised settings.7 In
Islamic law, too, the social from the legal is inseparable in countries
strictly adhering to classical Shariah. For example, the inferior status
ascribed to women in terms of entitlements (e.g., the right to be elected,
weight of testimony, etc.) also determines their social status.
The study of social interaction should have been of primary import-
ance to international criminal tribunals, but in practice it has been
peripheral if not outright redundant. The Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor
(OTP) in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) did
assess various background aspects to the conﬂicts in Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, but the emphasis was on political and military organisation.
The prosecutors and their assistants were naturally lawyers, some of
them successful prosecutors in their own jurisdictions, where the nature
of crimes was pretty straightforward and background assessments were
unnecessary. Hence, no one even considered that perceptions about class,
ethnicity, race, symbolism, peace, aggression, and the like, by the natives
themselves were of any signiﬁcance to the work of the tribunals. This is a
particularly signiﬁcant observation given that two of the stated aims of
the tribunals were their capacity to record history and promote
reconciliation.8 It is certainly difﬁcult to record the nature of particular
discord without a solid understanding of the views and perceptions of the
participants in the turmoil. Equally, reconciliation is meaningless unless
one is acutely aware of the divisions of the feuding parties as expressed
and felt by them alone; although, admittedly, external, unbiased, views
are also signiﬁcant.
7 See J. D. Vigil, ‘Urban Violence and Street Gangs’, (2003) 32 Annual Review of Anthro-
pology 225; D. Lamm Weisel, Contemporary Gangs: An Organisational Analysis (LBF
Scholarly Publishing, 2002).
8 For example, reference to universally accepted anthropological thinking about aggression
could have been incorporated in the historical analyses of the Tribunals’ judgment.
According to this, there is no empirical basis to the contention that aggression is an
inborn quality. In fact, the word itself is unknown in the more traditional societies, such as
the Chewong in the Malay Peninsula. If anything, humans exhibit a disposition towards
solidarity and peace. See S. Howell and R. Willis (eds.), Societies at Peace (Routledge, 1989)
at 25 ff. Without such an analysis the Tribunal may well, inadvertently or otherwise, give
the impression to the entire world that the perpetrator’s entire ethnic group is naturally
inclined towards violent crime, which cannot surely lead to any sort of reconciliation and
explains to a large degree the hostility of the Serbian people towards the ICTY.
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The ICTY, in a very cursorymanner, opined that BosnianMuslim identity
and culture was traced to ‘the long Turkish’ occupation9 and that the three
ethnic groups (i.e., Muslim, Serb and Croat) lived largely in separate villages
but often intermarried,10 and that in any event they all considered themselves
Slav.11 It concluded its anthropological analysis by claiming that ‘politics
began to divide along the lines of ethno-national communities’.12 This, of
course, fails to say anything about the actual identity and culture professed by
Bosnians. Culture, by way of illustration, is a complex phenomenon and
scholars such as Geertz have viewed it as a web of sharedmeanings expressed
through public communication, not in the sense of sharing the same know-
ledge and skills but in the sense that persons who in fact share a culture share
a common world view that is expressed through common symbols and
language.13 What is this Slavic world view in Bosnia and what metaphors
or literal meanings are used to express it? Moreover, if the people of Bosnia
had achieved social integration, how was this possible given their conﬂicting
individual/clan tendencies? There are various ways of thinking about this
conundrum, so I will mention only two. Barth believed that shared values,
expressed through interaction, are the result of strategic and calculating
transactions between agents driven by a desire to achieve value maximisa-
tion.14 For Bourdieu, in order to assess whether the members of a group
share or do not share common values one must distinguish that which is
taken for granted by the group and that which is beyond discussion (doxa),
such as faith in God or unquestionable adherence to a political system, from
things that are actively discussed among group members and are not there-
fore axiomatic (opinion).15 If we knew precisely what constituted common
or disparate doxic perceptions among the various groups in Bosnia, pertinent
choices would have been severely curtailed and wewould also understand by
default which doxic beliefs may have in time shifted to the realm of opinion.
In fact, anthropology has largely dismissed the notion of static ethnic identity
9 ICTY Prosecutor v. Tadić, Trial Judgment (7 May 1997), para. 56. In reality, a Turkish
nation and distinct Turkish culture were proclaimed in the early 1920s, although the neo-
Turkish movement was active at least a decade before. Until then, from the fourteenth to
the early twentieth century what the ICTY calls ‘Turkish’ was in fact distinctly Ottoman,
which was quintessentially multicultural, as are all empires.
10 Ibid., para. 64. 11 Ibid., para. 67. 12 Ibid., para. 83.
13 C. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (Basic Books, 1973).
14 F. Barth, ‘Models of Social Organisation’ (Royal Anthropological Institute Occasional
Paper No. 23, 1966). These transactions are numerous and are continuously negotiated
by the relevant actors.
15 P. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge University Press, 1977) at
164–70.
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based merely on the enjoyment of a particular culture and belonging to a
speciﬁc ethnic group.16 Boundaries between ethnic groups, especially those
living in close proximity to one another, are ambiguous and in a state of
continuous ﬂuctuation. The characterisation by the ICTY that the Slav
population of Bosnia in 1993 identiﬁed itself along three ethnic groups with
some inter-marriages is at best simplistic, but in reality it was wrong and was
not predicated on any scientiﬁc data. Anthropologists studying Bosnian
society agreed with the general theory that variations among ethnic groups
are greater on key indicators than in respect of their systematic differences.
They dismissed the conﬂict(s) as ethnic or that it could be explained by
reference to culture and ancient animosities.
The conﬂicts were relatively recent and they were not caused in any way
by cultural differences. In important respects, the differences between
town and country were greater than between, for example, Serbs and
Croats sharing the same territory.17
As the chapter will subsequently demonstrate, anthropological research is
not only important for possessing a clear understanding of the background
of conﬂicts and the motives of the immediate perpetrators and their victims.
It provides us, among others, with the necessary tools for deciphering the
elements of international crimes, such as ‘racial’,18 ‘ethnic’ and ‘religious’ in
respect of genocide, accessory liability and JCE in respect of ‘kinship’,19 and
16 See F. Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organisation of Culture Difference
(Little, Brown & Co, 1969).
17 T. Hylland Eriksen, What is Anthropology? (Pluto Press, 2004) at 158.
18 It is interesting to note that the science of genetics has long disproved the existence of
distinct races as such. Nonetheless, race as a social construction remains important
because it tells us how people view themselves and others.
19 In ICTR Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Chamber Judgment (2 September 1998), para. 81,
the Trial Chamber did make some mention to kinship, arguing that Rwandan society was
comprised of eighteen clans whose distinguishing feature was lineage as opposed to
ethnicity. Even so, the Tribunal argued, the demarcation line was blurred and people
could pass through each clan. The Trial Chamber then went on to discuss the views and
considerations not of the local population about their membership but of their colonisers:
ibid., at paras. 82–4. This lacks any sound methodology and when later the Chamber was
forced to admit that the Genocide Convention does not encompass conduct against
members of one’s own ethnic or racial group, it had to turn to particular perceptions
of the perpetrators and the victims. This selective anthropology is misleading and is
utilised only in order to serve a particular conclusion. The vast literature on African
kinship would have made it abundantly clear that in weakly integrated African nations
the operational level of political power is located at the kinship level of the periphery. As a
result, de facto power based on kinship is usually much stronger than de jure power
structures. See L. Holy, Anthropological Perspectives on Kinship (Pluto Press, 1996).
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‘loyalty’ and ‘clan membership’, all of which lose their meaning if subject
merely to strict legal characterisations.
At yet another dimension, the labours and methods of anthropology
assist us in distinguishing between myth and reality and give us a
fundamental idea about mens rea and mens rea-related defences and
excuses. D argues that he killed his mother but in fact it could very well
have been a distant cousin, simply because his linguistic tradition uses a
single word for all females in his lineage. This is pretty clear to him but
not to a foreign judge without any anthropological or linguistic insights
into D’s culture. The Japanese word aoi, for example, encompasses what
in Europe we conceive as green, blue and pale (as in a pale demeanour),
and the Welsh language had until recently similar colour connotations
that departed from those employed by their English neighbours.20 Later
on we shall examine the mythology and symbolism of cannibalism in
Sierra Leone and the limitations of language therein, but it is instructive
at this point to emphasise that what are otherwise rather straightforward
notions, which cannot under any circumstances possess a third (grey)
meaning, are in fact diffuse and ambiguous to other cultures. In a
landmark study of the 1920s, Rivers examined the Melanesian people
of the Solomon Islands. What is particularly striking is the use of the
local word mate which translates as ‘dead’ but also ‘very sick’ and ‘very
elderly’. Clearly, this is not in accord with our strict distinction between
dead and alive. Surely, a person can only be one or the other. Rivers
understood this to project a classiﬁcation, rather than a biological deter-
mination, from the point of view of the Melanesians. The very inﬁrm and
the very elderly were as good as dead because they could no longer
partake in the group’s activities and the idea was to draw a dividing line
between the mate and the toa (alive).21 Under this light, it would have
been perfectly acceptable for the Melanesians to eliminate all the mate in
their midst. However, from the perspective of international criminal
justice such an act would not only be reprehensible but would no doubt
constitute a crime against humanity. The juristic and ethical problem
here is obvious. Is it legitimate to convict someone of conduct under-
taken throughout one’s lifetime and which constitutes part of his or her
culture? I am not here going to entertain a discussion as to whether this
20 See E. Ardener (ed.), Social Anthropology and Language (Tavistock, 1971) at xxiv and
xxii.
21 W. H. R. Rivers, ‘The Primitive Conception of Death’, (1911–12) 10 Hibbert Journal 393,
at 406.
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anthropological ﬁnding is pertinent to excusing the accused from liability
(as a defence) or in mitigation of punishment, but the reader certainly
understands the implications. I am certainly not defending the conten-
tion that an unchecked self-proclaimed cultural relativism is a valid
defence to all international crimes.22 Rather, my desire is to offer a
new, or additional, perspective to our understanding and application of
international criminal norms through the study of context.
Infusing anthropological research methods in international
criminal investigations
The principal research method for anthropological research is that of
participant observation through ﬁeldwork. This requires framing a
research question from the outset and identifying a community for
observation. Fieldwork is generally constant and in order for someone
to undertake a thorough investigation it is evident that signiﬁcant time
periods must be spent living with the observed group, in addition to
mastering the group’s particular language, if at all possible. It is generally
considered that the minimum length of time required is one year. At the
end of one’s ﬁeld work, notes and interviews are taken back home and
the researcher tries to make sense of them, in light of their particular
context, with a view to shedding light on his or her research question.
The researcher may, or may not, compare his ﬁndings to those offered in
respect of other groups, being simply content with the study of the
particular group in question.23
The problem, of course, for criminal investigations is that tribunals
have little time to send out an anthropologist for a year to conduct ﬁeld
research, even if appointed at the same time the prosecutor begins to
collect evidence and establish a solid indictment. Experience has shown
that this is not an insurmountable problem given that from the time they
are established until their ﬁrst judgment is rendered international
22 The proponents of such arbitrary cultural relativism have claimed that the recruitment of
children in Africa to ﬁght in armed conﬂicts is largely voluntary and the enlisters do not
consider their actions as legally or morally culpable. T. Kelsall, Culture under Cross-
Examination: International Justice and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2009) at 146–70. See, also, from a socio-legal perspective, I. Bantekas, ‘Individual
Responsibility and the Application of Ignoratio Juris Non Excusat in International Law’,
(2011) 19 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law & Criminal Justice 85.
23 For an excellent practical guide, see K. O’Reilly, Ethnographic Methods (2nd edn,
Routledge, 2012).
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criminal tribunals usually require a period of at least three years. This is
more than sufﬁcient for a group of anthropologists who are expert in the
particular group(s) to undertake thorough ﬁeld work and come up with
concrete ﬁndings for the tribunal, or commission, as the case may be.24
The International Criminal Court (ICC) may well require six months to a
year before embarking on solid prosecutions. The more serious meth-
odological concern, however, is that the situation before and after the
commission of widespread atrocities will in all likelihood be fundamen-
tally different. Several parameters of culture will necessarily change –
although this has not been tested – and previous power structures will
have been altered by the disappearance of the perpetrators for fear of
revenge or prosecution.
Hence, if any form of participant observation is to take place at all in
post-conﬂict societies this must be undertaken with this context in mind
and the framing of very speciﬁc research agendas. Fortunately, the vast
majority of societies have been studied by anthropologists in one form
or another. This is to say that there is a signiﬁcant body of literature on
all social groups, but this does not encompass all their cultural traits
and social interactions. Hence, the courts, with the assistance of experts,
can readily turn to the existing body of knowledge and decide whether
more research is necessary to ﬁll particular gaps that are subsequently
identiﬁed. No doubt, anthropologists should have access to the abun-
dance of material that is collected by the prosecutor and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) in the course of their investigation,
or material gathered in the course of providing assistance to victims and
witnesses. Much of this may seem irrelevant, either because it is hearsay,
repetitive, biased etc., but even so an expert may be able to detect solid
patterns that are linked with existing ﬁndings and which are not
repudiated by the scholarly community. These observations do not, of
24 In this chapter and throughout the book the idea is that the offences under consideration
are prosecuted by domestic or international criminal tribunals. However, it is not unusual
for several serious international offences to be handled by truth commissions, whether
UN-based or other. The ﬁndings in this chapter are pertinent to the work of these
commissions even if they are composed solely of people belonging to the same ethnic
group as the perpetrators. It should not be assumed that they have a perfect understand-
ing of their culture. We have already discussed Bourdieu’s concept of doxa. Anthropolo-
gists frequently refer to homeblindedness as a methodological limitation. This refers to
ﬁeldwork undertaken by someone well-versed in the society under examination, which
prevents him from gaining deeper insights because he takes things for granted and looks
at them through a distorting lens.
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course, suggest that the judges must confer their fact-ﬁnding and judi-
cial role to anthropologists, but that they must take cognisance of social
relationships with which they are unfamiliar in order to serve both the
narrow (dispensing of justice) and broad (history-writing, reconcili-
ation) aims of international criminal justice. A necessary disclaimer
should, of course, underlie all interaction between judges and anthro-
pologists; namely, ‘publication’ conﬁrmation bias. This is essentially a
distortion in human information processing where reviewers/editors of
books and scientiﬁc journals accept for publication papers that support
their views while ignoring and discrediting those that do not.25 This
phenomenon is more prevalent in the humanities than in legal scholar-
ship because of the tendency to set up doctrinal ‘schools’ upon which
succeeding scholars base their theoretical and empirical work, and
hence tribunals should verify the veracity of their information from
multiple sources, if available.
Anthropology as a tool for assessing complex liabilities
At a very basic level and in respect of assessing complex liabilities
pertinent to international crimes, such as command responsibility,
anthropology can assist us to ascertain those elusive de facto indicia
that are necessary for constructing authority, power and ultimately
effective control. It also allows us to understand whether the ‘subordin-
ates’ that committed the crimes were under sufﬁcient compulsion or
control by their superiors, such that justiﬁes the latter’s conviction
despite the absence of direct fault. Before we go on, however, it is
important to make a signiﬁcant observation that relates to semantics.
If anthropology is viewed as a method by which to draw conclusions
pertinent to the fault-liability paradigm or complex liabilities, then this
method requires an appropriate language in order to communicate
concepts and ideas into the sphere of law.26 Communication is crucial
not only because certain words are not translatable from one language
to another, as we have already had the chance to explore, but also
because wholesale concepts and ideas themselves are alien from one
25 J. Mahoney, ‘Publication Prejudices: An Experimental Study of Conﬁrmatory Bias in the
Peer Review System’, (1977) 1 Cognitive Therapy and Research 161.
26 See E. Mertz, ‘Language, Law and Social Meanings: Linguistic/Anthropological Contri-
butions to the Study of Law’, (1992) 26 Law & Society Review 413.
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culture to another.27 The so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, elaborated
by the respective anthropologists in the 1930s, suggests that language
gives rise to fundamental differences in the respective life-worlds which
the various groups inhabit. In their case study, the North American
native Hopi language was found to contain few nouns but many verbs,
which necessarily connoted action and movement. They concluded
from this that the Hopi world was predicated around movement and
that it was largely disinterested in objects.28
A very poignant example, apart from those already provided in previ-
ous sections, is necessary in order to better illustrate the point. In the case
against Charles Taylor, a prosecution witnesses named ‘ZigZag’ Marzah
was quite clearly unfamiliar with the Western idiom of remorse and
conscience.29 He also claimed that he was involved in cannibalism of
enemy corpses, arguing that this was something expected of all warriors
battling on the side of Charles Taylor.30 Whether or not this statement is
true, it certainly stirs a wealth of emotions in the Western psyche and
reinforces myths and stereotypes associated with primitive Africa. In fact,
anthropological research suggests that cannibalism was historically
unknown in human history,31 or that in any event it was alien in
27 See M. van Hoecke, Law as Communication (Hart, 2002), in which the author’s central
thesis is that all legal relations are to be understood in terms of dialogue, conversation and
communicative processes, rather than as traditional command–obedience structures.
Legal anthropologists such a Bohannan argued that Western legal terms and categories
should not be employed to study the organisation and order of non-Western societies. He
believed that such a methodology prevented a comprehensive understanding of other
cultures and argued in favour of using native legal terms whose meaning would become
evident within an ethnographic context. P. Bohannan, Justice and Judgment among the
Tiv (Oxford University Press, 1957). This also leads to the so-called methodological
distortion of ethnocentrism.
28 The most contemporary manifestation of the hypothesis is currently known as linguistic
relativity, which posits that language does have some effect on thought, but this is small as
opposed to decisive. See P. Kay and W. Kempton, ‘What is the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis?’,
(1984) 86 American Anthropologist 65.
29 G. Anders, ‘Testifying about Uncivilised Events: Problematic Representations of Africa in
the Trial against Charles Taylor’, (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 937, at
944–5.
30 Ibid., at 948–9.
31 However, for the sake of scientiﬁc accuracy it has to be said that a good number of
anthropologists reject the claim that cannibalism is just a myth created from prejudice.
Works such as that of W. Arens, The Man-Eating Myth: Anthropology and Anthropoph-
agy (Oxford University Press, 1980) are reﬂective of the attitude that rejects cannibalism.
More recent forensic research of human bones from an Anasazi pueblo in south-western
Colorado reveals that nearly thirty men, women and children were butchered and cooked
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contemporary African societies. Anders recalls the Human Leopards case
investigated by a Special Commission Court set up by British colonial
authorities in early twentieth-century Sierra Leone. There, and without
any corroborating forensic evidence, the court was convinced that
members of a secret society dressing up in leopard skins went about
ritual cannibalism. The basic story was described by insider witnesses
whose communication with their colonisers must have been agonising,
through language that was fraught with signiﬁcant misunderstanding
and symbolism and which was moreover read through two very different
socio-cultural perspectives. Anders accurately captures this as follows:
In Sierra Leone and Liberia, as in many parts of Africa, social relationships
and personal development are framed in a rich language of eating and
consumption. Initiation into secret societies such as the poro is also expressed
in an idiom of being eaten or devoured by the bush spirits in order to be
reborn as a full member of the community. . . . The political sphere, in
particular, is conceptualised as a potentially dangerous terrain where power-
ful people ‘eat’ each other in order to grow ‘big’. This has been famously
coined by Bayart as the politics of the belly, who describes the consumption
of the State’s resources by politicians and bureaucrats. In Sierra Leone,
corrupt politicians are referred to as bobor bele – literally, guys with a belly
eating the State’s resources. Therefore, the frequent cannibalism accusations
in West Africa must not always be read literally. They should rather be
interpreted in terms of a highly symbolic political language and critique of
existing injustices [as is the case with Sierra Leone].32
To a Western audience it seems implausible that anyone can genuinely
confuse symbolism with reality, or, to put it bluntly, confuse actual cannibal-
ismwith itsmetaphors. How can you say one thing and, without intentionally
lying, actually mean something completely different? How is it that symbol-
ism can be so easily transformed into action? This is not the time or place to
expand fully on these issues but it is widely admitted in the anthropological
literature that ideas of witchcraft, spirit possession and shamanistic injunc-
tions had a normative effect on themembers of the vastmajority of traditional
societies.33 The same is largely true today in the industrialised world with
there around 1100 AD. See T. D. White, Prehistoric Cannibalism at Mancos 5Mtumr—
2346 (Princeton University Press, 1992).
32 Anders, above note 29, at 956.
33 See S. Brandes, Power and Persuasion: Fiestas and Social Control in Rural Mexico
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988); H. M. Bergsma, ‘Tiv Proverbs as a Means of
Social Control’, (1970) 40 Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 151.
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pious members of religious groups. This is no doubt a form of social control.
To illustrate the point I shall offer two case studies from the recent past.
A signiﬁcant part of the Rwandan genocide was predicated on a myth
or symbolism reiterated and spread by the Hutu that the Tutsi were
cockroaches and inferior beings. Whereas no Hutu would typically act
on this myth unilaterally, it was the seed for future events, when
animosity was stirred through artiﬁcial means and channels; and an
illiterate and highly polarised populace was unable to separate myth
from reality. Anthropological research on the Rwandan genocide tends
to show that one of the principal cultural metaphors in Rwanda, the
‘ﬂow’, may shed some light on some of the methods for killing and
torturing used by the Hutu. ‘Flow’ in general represents something
healthy, as is the case with our blood stream or the transformation of
food into faeces and insemination into childbirth. Blockage of ‘ﬂow’
is associated with disease and death. The impalement of victims from
the anus to the mouth as well as mass killings at check points, in
addition to other motives, symbolises the end of ‘ﬂow’.34 To a Western
audience it may to some degree explain certain acts of sheer cruelty
(although certainly not fully), as well as demonstrate the existence of
genocidal patterns amounting to systematic.
The second example is very similar, despite the fact that it took
place more than ﬁfty years earlier and fuelled the psyche of a much
more literate and ‘civilised’ population. I am referring to Nazi propa-
ganda, well prior to the commencement of World War II in 1939,
through a process of dehumanising its enemies, such as Slavs, com-
munists and Jews. In a world where international travel was exceptional
and propaganda had crept into every aspect of social life (school,
private clubs, censoring of all publications and broadcasts) it did not
take long for the Nazi party to cast doubt in the minds of the German
population about the humanity of other races and peoples. This dehu-
manisation was nothing more than myth-creation, as also was the
case for the superiority of the Arians.35 However, it is well known that
such myths occupy a signiﬁcant place in the collective consciousness
of a nation, which is susceptible to manipulation for committing crimes
34 C. C. Taylor, ‘The Cultural Face of Terror in the Rwandan Genocide’, in A. L. Hinton
(ed.), Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide (University of California
Press, 2002) at 137–78.
35 D. J. Goldhagan, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust
(Alfred Knopf, 1996).
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against class enemies36 or in order to achieve less ‘innocuous’ political
objectives.37
In the context of the ICTR’s investigation, legal anthropology neces-
sarily turned out to play a signiﬁcant part in the reconstruction of liability
for genocide, albeit largely unbeknown to the judges. It will be recalled
that in its ﬁrst case, that of Jean Paul Akayesu, the Tribunal was reluctant
to apply the exact terms of Article II of the Genocide Convention, which
required that the crime could only be committed against members of
another ethnic, national, religious or racial group. Forensic evidence
demonstrated that the Hutu and the Tutsi were not ethnically or racially
distinct; quite the opposite. Their respective ‘ethnic’ designations had
been engineered by their Belgian colonisers and these had subsequently
matured into distinctions of class or social status. The Tribunal therefore
turned to what it might have perceived as legal anthropology in order to
construct a more objective theory of victimhood for the purposes of the
Genocide Convention. It held that beyond external characteristics such as
race and ethnic origin, membership of a group may also come about by
the personal belief of a group’s members as to their distinctiveness.38
Thus far it is at par with the fundamental tenets of social anthropology.
However, this personal self-distinction and self-categorisation is sanc-
tioned only if it is perceived as such by the group under consideration
itself (informants), not external observers. The Tribunal offered no prior
study, nor one commissioned by itself, that would have shown the views
of the informants. This demonstrates that international criminal tribu-
nals perceive extra-legal matters as common knowledge, not worthy of
further scientiﬁc research, upon which a reasonable man is well suited to
reach a reasonable conclusion.
This is, no doubt, a convenient mechanism by which to construct
group characteristics in an artiﬁcial rather than a social science manner.
36 See C. C. Wang, Words Kill: Calling for the Destruction of Class Enemies in China,
1949–1953 (Routledge, 2004).
37 An interesting, highly critical, insight is offered by Chomsky, on the imagery employed in
liberal nations to achieve pre-ordained social and political goals by elites. N. Chomsky,
Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies (South End Press, 1989).
38 ICTR Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Chamber Judgment (2 September 1998), para. 702. In
ICC Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of
Arrest against Omar Al-Bashir (4 March 2009), para. 137, an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber
claimed that three Sudanese tribal groups living in the same area, namely the Fur, the
Masalit and the Zaghawa, constituted distinct ethnic groups because each possessed its
own language, tribal customs and traditional links to its lands. Without realising it, the
Pre-Trial Chamber made an anthropological observation with legal signiﬁcance.
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Its foundation is hardly scientiﬁc but is based on the judges’ efforts to ﬁt
the groups, and members thereof, under discussion within the terms of
the Genocide Convention and other forms of criminal liability. Whether
or not the Tribunal’s assessment of collective identity would withstand
thorough anthropological research is a different issue altogether. It is
therefore critical that when foreign judges assess the criminal liability of
persons from cultures they know little about the assistance of a team of
anthropologists, experts in the peoples in question, be sought. The
objective of the experts must be to map the various social interactions
and institutions of the pertinent people so as to provide a guide as to
what is acceptable in the community, distinguish myth and symbolism
from reality and apprise the Tribunal of those cultural factors that may
inhibit witnesses and victims from testifying. This will no doubt assist the
prosecutor and the defence in asking the right questions and thus save
precious judicial time.
Obedience and effective control in social culture: understanding
leadership and command in army and rebel outﬁts
One of the key issues in war crimes trials is the degree to which a
subordinate would obey a superior order not as a matter of military
compulsion but as a matter of ingrained culture. An assessment of such
culture, as well as class or similar social constructs, is important because
it signiﬁes the degree to which one may assume effective control
in respect of jungle-based armies and militias and thus provide an
understanding of the structure of hierarchical systems and their distinct
organisation. This is by no means a new theme, given that it has troubled
law-makers and courts since complex liabilities, such as command
responsibility, were ﬁrst punctuated on the legal map with the
Yamashita case.39 There, it was controversially held that Yamashita
retained effective control over Japanese troops that went on the rampage
against civilians in Manila, even though he had split the Japanese forces
in the Philippines into four distinct groups, with all communication
between them having been severed by their adversaries. The Tribunal
maintained that the atrocities were so widespread that Yamashita must
have known about them and could have prevented them, despite the
argument of the accused that he had given strict instructions to the
39 Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 4 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 1.
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Manila-based commander to evacuate the island and return to Japan.
Clearly, in the absence of any direct orders the Tribunal could not have
constructed Yamashita’s command liability had it not arbitrarily
assumed that he enjoyed effective control of all Japanese forces on the
island.
Whatever the actual facts on the ground, a retrospective examination
of effective control would no doubt be illumined by reference to anthro-
pological data. Again, it is not my intention to go into any signiﬁcant
detail, but given that the case hung on whether Yamashita’s subordinates
had in fact disobeyed his orders to evacuate and avoid harming civilians,
it is worth investigating Japanese military culture at the time. With the
adoption of Shinto as the country’s ofﬁcial State religion in 1890, an
Emperor cult was established whereby the Emperor’s divinity was based
on his descent from the Goddess Amaterasu. This meant that the
Emperor’s commands, and by implication those of his representatives,
were to be obeyed without objection. This unswerving loyalty to the
Emperor as the basis of the Japanese State (known as kokutai, which
may be translated manifold, particularly ‘sovereign’ or ‘national essence’)
had earlier been institutionalised by the introduction of universal con-
scription, which resulted in the indoctrination of the country’s youth and
which continued through subsequent generations.40 This cultural dimen-
sion, coupled undoubtedly with fear and other elements, accounts for the
acceptance of brutality within the ranks of the Japanese army and its
members’ ‘loyalty-to-the-death’. As a result, it would have been charac-
teristically untypical and out of all logic for the forces under Yamashita’s
de jure command to disobey their commander’s direct orders. By logical
implication, no distinction can be made between de jure and de facto
command in respect of the Japanese military organisation during World
War II because, even if separated from their commanders, units and sub-
units would always religiously adhere to their superiors’ original orders –
unless, of course, there were other available orders. This observation also
suggests that in this particular socio-military context the absence of
material capacity to prevent or punish is irrelevant in establishing de
40 In fact, kokutai was introduced as a fundamental building block in Article 4 of Japan’s
1890 Constitution, also known as the Meiji Constitution, on account of the Tenno
dynasty which assumed power through the 1868 Meiji restoration, remaining in power
until 1945. See G. M. Beckmann, The Making of the Meiji Constitution: The Oligarchs and
the Constitutional Development of Japan, 1868–1891 (University of Kansas Press, 1957).
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facto or de jure command because the conduct of subordinates is uniform
irrespective of the person under command.
In the Rwanda conﬂict, de facto command and control became a
central issue because, unlike the military-styled paramilitary groups on
the territory of the former Yugoslavia, a signiﬁcant amount of authority
was exercised on the basis of traditional socio-economic structures.
Rwandan society, like most of Africa, is tribal and class-based, with
authority and privileges typically belonging to the elite in each tribe or
clan.41 As a result, authority and wealth go hand-in-hand, with the elite
also being the richest and better educated among the tribe. Until the
creation of the ICTR the construction of command responsibility had
been applied to regular armies and, at worst, to tightly structured para-
military units, which, however, resembled regular armies principally
because they were formed and run by ex-military personnel, as was the
case with indictments before the ICTY. The most complex cases had been
those dealt with by subsequent World War II military tribunals in respect
of civilians, particularly industrial and political leaders.42
The ICTR paid particular attention to these distinct anthropological
features in its construction of hierarchies and authority in Rwandan
society, although admittedly inadvertently and without the requisite
methodological or scientiﬁc rigour. In the Akayesu case the accused
was the burgomaster of Taba commune, a position akin to that of mayor
in Western parlance. Whereas Western mayors enjoy no other authority
than to enact peripheral by-laws and set the municipality’s economic
agenda on the basis of municipal taxes and other income, in Rwanda the
burgomaster enjoyed far greater authority.43 His powers were found to be
much wider than his de jure authority.44 In fact, he was perceived as the
41 For an excellent anthropological account, see R. Lemarchand, ‘Power and Stratiﬁcation in
Rwanda: A Reconsideration’, (1996) 6 Cahiers d’études Africaines 592.
42 See Government Commissioner of the General Tribunal of the Military Government for the
French Zone of Occupation in Germany v. Roechling 14 Trials of War Criminals before
the Nuremberg Military Tribunals (Trials) 1097; USA v. Flick 6 Trials 1187; and USA v.
von Weizsaecker (Ministries case) 14 Trials 308. Once again, although no direct anthro-
pological questions were asked by these tribunals, it was deemed implicit that those to
whom powers were delegated by the Nazi regime enjoyed sufﬁcient control over persons
committing particular crimes. This was a direct consequence of Nazi culture, which
permeated all elements of the Reich’s socio-economic raison d’être.
43 This is conﬁrmed by the vast literature in respect of weakly integrated nations where the
real power lies with powerful individuals in the periphery. See J. Gledhill, Power and its
Disguises: Anthropological Perspectives on Politics (Pluto Press, 1994).
44 Akayesu Trial judgment, above note 38, para. 57.
256 bantekas
Comp. by: Amoudha Stage: Proof Chapter No.: 9 Title Name: BANTEKASandMYLONAKI
Date:16/7/14 Time:15:37:47 Page Number: 257
‘father’ of the people, whose every order was to be obeyed without
question or deviation.45 Clearly, informal law and power arrangements,
whether explicit or implicit, played an important role in ascertaining the
enjoyment of effective control over the actions of civilian populations
acting as mobs, random groups or under a self-perceived identity. The
existence of such effective control is further reinforced by class and
education. This African case study exempliﬁes the Tribunal’s desire to
construct (or expand) complex liabilities on the basis of anthropological
observations in order to reach a just conclusion; in the case at hand to
establish the liability of an inﬂuential ﬁgure urging those under his circle
of inﬂuence to commit genocide.
The role and origin of inﬂuence in Sierra Leone’s armed groups
We have already made extensive reference to myth and symbolism in the
popular culture of Sierra Leonean society. The Sierra Leone Special Court
(SLSC) has only indirectly examined the anthropological dimension of
the various armed groups and its relevance to our understanding of
conduct and hierarchies. With respect to the latter, the jurisprudence of
the SLSC has revealed two broad types of military authority. The ﬁrst is
consistent with that found in regular armies and rebel forces, on the basis
of a strict or not so strict hierarchical structure. This seems to be the case
with the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Revolu-
tionary United Front (RUF). The second type of authority depends less
on formal hierarchies and is instead entrenched in symbolism and
mythology. This much is true with respect to the Kamajors and their
Civil Defence Forces (CDF). No doubt, elements of both types of author-
ity are found in all groups in one form or another.
That mythology, mysticism and symbolism played a role in the mili-
tary organisation of Sierra Leone’s factions comes as no surprise, as was
revealed earlier in this chapter. This was further facilitated by the fact
that, although the country is host to twenty African groups (the largest of
which are the Temne and Mende), it is multi-religious and the war did
not start along ethnic or religious lines. Rebel groups and militias were
thus ethnically and religiously diverse, a phenomenon already reﬂected in
membership of the country’s secret societies, particularly the poro and
the bondo. Exceptionally, the composition of the Kamajors was Mende-
45 Ibid., paras. 55, 74.
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based, albeit their aim was not necessarily to engage in inter-ethnic
rivalries.46 That the SLSC made a serious effort to explain the mythology
and mysticism underlying the organisation of the Kamajors is evidence of
the fact that social phenomena are of acute relevance in ascribing the
attributes of authority in order to construct complex liabilities. It will be
recalled that the ICTY largely rejected or, at least, ignored such factors on
the assumption that factions on the territory of Bosnia were neatly
divided along ethnic/religious lines and, as a result, there was no need
to enquire into other shared traits between members of the groups.
I will draw on one element here that is intriguing and which, although
rejected by the ICTY, should have found a place in the jurisprudence of
the SLSC. I am referring to the power or authority to ‘inﬂuence’ as an
indication or evidence of effective control. Indeed, in the Čelebići case the
accused Delalič was found to be a highly inﬂuential ﬁgure in the Bosnian
army. He would possess authority to sign contracts and release orders in
a prisoner-of-war (POW) camp and to liaise with the highest echelons of
the Bosnian Muslim authorities; yet, he did not possess formal authority
over other subordinates, especially those in the POW camp. The Tribunal
did not consider that this highly inﬂuential individual, in the absence of
any direct subordinates, yielded sufﬁcient control over those running the
POW camp such as would have allowed him to intervene in the com-
mission of crimes against the prisoners.47 This conclusion was drawn at a
time when the construction of the complex liability of command respon-
sibility did not warrant open-ended expansion. It was enough for the
Tribunal that only persons exercising effective control over subordinates
were subject to the doctrine. The Tribunal rightly felt that if everyone
yielding inﬂuence could also be encompassed the ﬂoodgates would be
open to convict persons who were not at fault.48 The key word here is
fault. If D, a boy-scout leader, has exerted and continues to exert
signiﬁcant inﬂuence over a group of boy scouts who are recruited as
46 K. Dupuy and H. M. Binningsbø, Power-Sharing and Peace-Building in Sierra Leone
(CSCW Papers, 2007) at 3–4.
47 ICTY Prosecutor v. Delalić et al. (Čelebići case), Trial Chamber judgment (16 November
1998), paras. 266, 653–6.
48 This is particularly reﬂected in its pronouncements in ICTY Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and
Talić, Trial Chamber Judgment (1 September 2004) paras. 276, 281; ICTY Prosecutor v.
Naletilić and Martinović, Trial Chamber Judgment (21 March 2003), para. 68. These
judgments certainly inﬂuenced the decision of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina
in Prosecutor v. Alić, Trial Chamber Judgment, Case No X-KR-06/294 (11 April 2008)
at 46.
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minors by a rebel group, it cannot be seriously claimed that he possesses
sufﬁcient control over all their future actions, particularly when they are
spatially and geographically removed from him. D clearly lacks fault for
failing to use his powers of inﬂuence to dissuade the youths. However, if
D was in proximity to the minors and was an inﬂuential ﬁgure in the
broader echelons of the group, he possesses the material capacity to
employ his inﬂuence over the minors, even if he does not enjoy effective
control by reason of direct subordination. In this latter scenario D is at
material fault, although it will depend on the particular circumstances as
to whether this fault may substantiate command responsibility or other
types of complex liabilities. These particular circumstances are none
other than D’s material capacity to act.49 It deﬁes logic and the dictates
of justice to assert that a person with the direct capacity to save hundreds
of lives by simply averting the would-be perpetrators bears no liability
simply because he was not incumbent with a pre-existing duty to act.
This is not merely an iteration or transplantation of the duty to save
strangers typically associated with civil law jurisdictions. It goes at the
very heart of material fault and all that it stands for.
It is not clear whether the SLSC shares this conviction, given that it has
not expressly rejected or upheld this thesis.50 It is certain that the SLSC
was unaware of the scholarly literature suggesting that power of inﬂuence
is possible even in the absence of authority over one’s target audience.51
Imagine if inﬂuence and authority are merged into a single entity. Had
the Special Court been cognisant of these arguments it might have taken
up the proposition that in situations where the power relations and social
status between several individuals is chaotic, direct subordination is not
necessary in order for the more inﬂuential person to establish effective
control merely by his or her powers of inﬂuence.52 This chaotic power
49 This is why Mettraux sides with the judgments of the ICTY to reject inﬂuence as
establishing de facto control. See G. Mettraux, The Law of Command Responsibility
(Oxford University Press, 2009) at 183 ff.
50 In SLSC Prosecutor v. Brima, Kanaru and Kanu, Judgment (20 June 2007), para. 788, the
SLSC referred to a number of indicia as evidence of effective control. These may
implicitly be read – although one could argue otherwise – as encompassing cases of
signiﬁcant and overpowering inﬂuence.
51 See L. A. Hill, Exercising Inﬂuence without Formal Authority: How New Managers can
Build Power and Inﬂuence (Harvard Business Press, 2008); A. R. Cohen and D. L.
Bradford, Inﬂuence without Authority (Wiley, 2005). Hill’s motto, a pioneer on this topic,
is that: ‘all inﬂuential managers have power but not all powerful managers have inﬂuence’.
52 Inﬂuence is probably not the appropriate term here and this certainly explains why the ad
hoc tribunals have rejected inﬂuence-based effective control out of hand. It should be
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gap certainly existed in the context of the military factions engaged in
Sierra Leone’s bloody wars. The spiritual leader of the Kamajors, Kon-
dewa, is an interesting case study. The Kamajors were originally organ-
ised as a group ofMende hunters who responded to the directives of their
various chiefs to protect people from the rebels.53 As a result, its
members did not possess the military skills and discipline of a regular
or rebel army. They were in need of organisation and guidance in order
to become an organised ﬁghting unit.54 This guidance came both from
military as well as spiritual leaders. Kondewa was of the latter kind:
He was the head of all the CDF initiators initiating the Kamajors into the
Kamajor society in Sierra Leone. His job was to prepare herbs which the
Kamajors smeared on their bodies to protect them against bullets. Kon-
dewa was not a ﬁghter, he himself never went to the war front or into
active combat, but whenever a Kamajor was going to war, he would go to
Kondewa for advice and blessing. . . . The Kamajors believed in the
mystical powers of the initiators, especially Kondewa, and that the process
of the initiation and immunisation would make them bullet-proof. The
Kamajors looked up to Kondewa and admired the man with such
powers. . . . Because of the mystical powers Kondewa possessed, he had
command over the Kamajors from every part of the country.55
The Special Court opined that Kondewa’s mystical powers did not
automatically confer upon him military authority over the recruits and
their operations.56 On the contrary, it was his de jure position of High
Priest of the CDF that granted him some degree of effective control in
certain situations and it was in respect of this that he was found to enjoy
effective control.57
The SLSC missed a golden opportunity to defy the Čelebići myth by
expressly stipulating that under certain circumstances the yielding of
inﬂuence between asymmetric actors can give rise to effective control
irrespective of the military, civilian or other context in which it is exer-
cised. If a person can convince another that following a ritual he will be
unaffected by his adversaries’ weapons, it is absurd to claim that this
person does not possess powers akin, if not far superior, to those enjoyed
understood as possessing the material and mental power to compel another to do or
abstain from doing something.
53 SLSC Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Judgment (2 August 2007), para. 354.
54 Even so, universal discipline remained problematic because some ﬁghters ‘acted on their
own without knowledge of central command because their area of operation was so wide’.
Ibid., para. 358.
55 Ibid., paras. 344–6. 56 Ibid., para. 806. 57 Ibid., para. 686.
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in a superior-subordinate relationship. Such powers of inﬂuence are no
doubt rare, but in Sierra Leone, where the mystical and the symbolic
coincide with the real and the brutal, the anthropological basis of the
relevant relationships should have been given much more prominence.
Just as the results of one anthropological study cannot be transplanted into
another – although some general observations may be possible – in the
same manner the ﬁndings of the SLSC need not necessarily be accepted as
immutable truths applicable in all future conﬂicts. I am not convinced by
the argument that inﬂuence can never give rise to effective control-type
situations. This position is sustainable, of course, as long as it is proven
that the person in question had the material capacity to prevent or punish
the crimes committed by those persons over whom he enjoyed signiﬁcant
inﬂuence. I can only hope that the jurisprudence will take anthropological
evidence into consideration and ﬁnally move towards this direction.
Conclusion
As is the case with all the chapters in this book, this chapter is meant to
provide a fresh perspective to international criminal justice. The law
continues to remain paramount, as does its objectivity, but here the
emphasis was placed on understanding the societies where violence
occurred, and deciphering the social relations of their people. This is
crucial not only for the well-functioning of international criminal tribu-
nals and the correct application of the pertinent law, but also for making
the correct policy choices in respect of post-conﬂict or transitional
societies.58 As far as the latter is concerned, if we are aware of the
aspirations of the local population and if it were to be demonstrated that
very little, if any, animosity exists between the rival groups, it makes
sense to adopt a policy that reinforces a combination of domestic crim-
inal justice and physical reconstruction rather than place all resources
and energy upon a single international criminal justice mechanism.
Equally, our comprehension of social and cultural relations and the
causes behind a conﬂict provides a tribunal with the necessary tools to
58 Numerous anthropologists suggest that female genital mutilation (FGM), for example, is
best tackled through non-legal means, not only because enforcement institutions are
weak but also because the persistence of FGM is based on the lack of empowerment and
hostile customary attitudes. See N. Vitalis-Pemunta, Human Rights and Socio-Legal
Resistance against Female Genital Cutting: An Anthropological Perspective (Verlag,
2011), who studied the FGM practices of the Ejagham in Cameroon.
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assess power relations – through kinship and lineage arrangements – and
paint a largely accurate picture of the situation. This in turn may well be
the ﬁrst step towards writing a historical record, which is after all a stated
objective of international criminal justice. We have shown in this chapter
that anthropology assists not only in supplementary criminal justice
goals (i.e., reconciliation, reconstruction and history-writing), but also
in primary ones, namely the correct application of international norms.
The ICTY and the ICTR were largely disinclined to employ anthropo-
logical data, and this is clearly evident from the introductory sections of
their ﬁrst judgments, where they are content to cite only historical and
intelligence sources in order to explain the underlying causes of the
conﬂict. As these judgments went on, however, it was clear that the
Tribunals lacked concrete deﬁnitions to crucial legal questions, namely
whether the Tutsi were racially or ethnically diverse from the Hutu, or
whether the real power structure in the communes of Rwanda was in
practice much different than that on paper. The ICTR ultimately
responded to these questions by inadvertently resorting to anthropo-
logical research methods and, although the outcome was satisfactory,
the process was poor. The same poor results are encountered in the work
of the SLSC, which should have learned from the mistakes of its prede-
cessors and infused a serious anthropological dimension into its adjudi-
cative function. Its inability to distinguish between myth, symbolism and
reality in respect of the cannibalism described by some of the witnesses
and attested to by some of the alleged perpetrators is a serious impedi-
ment to the just application of the law. A person may well be convicted
for conduct which when described in one language means one thing but
when translated means something completely different.
The recommendation of this author is that although anthropology is
not a sine qua non condition for the application of international criminal
justice, it must nonetheless become an integral part of international
investigations. When a tribunal is established, or when the ICC takes
on a new situation, it is imperative that a team of experts with particular
expertise in the region and peoples under investigation be established
with a view to bringing forth existing knowledge and in order to conduct
new investigations if necessary. The experts’ research tools and ﬁndings
must guide the tribunals but should never substitute or pre-empt sound
judicial determination. In this manner, it is hoped that blind justice will
also assist the society under consideration, as well as other societies on
the brink of conﬂict, to assess its distortions and ultimately address them
from within.
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